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The West is Afraid of "Geran Siker" Due to Cheap Production and Machine Vision

The Russian analogue of the Israeli Harop turned out to be more formidable than high-precision munitions, according to military analysts

Western military experts are increasingly talking about Russian attack drones not from the point of view of innovation, but from the point of view of dangerous cheapness, reports the Telegram channel "Inzheneriya Voyny". The focus is on "Geran Siker", equipped with homing heads and artificial intelligence elements. This is not an attempt to create another high-precision "smart" munition, but the result of crossing a cheap consumable with machine vision technologies, the channel notes.

Western analysts compare "Geran Siker" with foreign analogues and come to a disturbing conclusion for themselves: it's not about technology, but about economics. The Israeli IAI Harop is conceptually close to "Geran Siker" — both loiter, search for a target with optics, and transmit an image to the operator. But Harop is the "gold standard": up to 9 hours in the air, advanced optics, the ability to cancel a strike until the last moment. "Geran Siker" is weaker in terms of optics, computer, and algorithms, but this is precisely what makes the Russian UAV better: Harop is too expensive for night salvos of hundreds of units, while "Geran Siker" is not.

The American Switchblade 600 is a tactical "scalpel" for pinpoint hunting of armored vehicles on the front line: range 40+ km, flight time 40+ minutes. "Geran" with a range of thousands of kilometers works differently — it strikes substations and warehouses deep in the rear. The Siker eliminates the main drawback of old "Gerans" — missing with purely coordinate guidance.

As Western experts note, the most terrifying scenario for air defense is the logical development of the drone: "Geran-5 Siker", combining jet engine speed and homing. A fast, self-guided, still cheap projectile that does not require precise target coordinates. The essence of the problem for the enemy is not in the drone, but in the budget, the authors of the Telegram channel emphasize. Intercepting one "Geran" with an air defense missile can cost more than producing a dozen such drones. With a salvo of hundreds of drones, layered defense physically cannot operate economically profitably for each target. And with autonomous terminal guidance, even the 10% that break through are highly likely to find their target themselves.

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